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1The effect of Demand Response and wind
generation on electricity investment and operation
Sheila Nolan, Mel Devine, Muireann A´. Lynch, and Mark O’Malley, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract—We present a novel method of determining the con-
tribution of load-shifting Demand Response (DR) to energy and
reserve markets. We model DR in an Mixed Complementarity
Problem (MCP) framework with high levels of wind penetra-
tion. Investment, exit and operational decisions are optimised
simultaneously. We examine the potential for DR to participate
in both energy and reserve markets. DR participation in the
energy market reduces costs and prices but the impact of
DR participation in reserve markets is limited. DR and wind
generation are strongly complementary, due to the ability of DR
to mitigate against the variability of wind generation, with the
highest impacts of DR seen at high levels of wind penetration. DR
participation in the energy market gives rise to lower equilibrium
levels of investment in conventional generation and induces a
Pareto improvement versus a market with no DR participation.
The total impact of DR is highly dependent on specific system
characteristics.
Index Terms—Demand Response, Load-Shifting, Mixed Com-
plementarity Problem, Markets, Reserve
I. INTRODUCTION
Demand Response (DR) is the term used to describe the
adjustment by consumers of their electricity consumption
in response to system or market conditions. DR is capable
of participating in all electricity markets, including energy
and reserve markets, thereby potentially availing of multiple
revenue streams that correspond to its contribution to the
system [1], [2], [3], [4], [5]. DR can participate in energy
markets by offering services such as load-shifting, wherein
a consumer reduces load (demand) at times of high prices
and increases load at times of lower prices. It has also been
illustrated in the literature that DR is well-placed to provide
some reserve services [6], [7], [8], [3], which we define as
services that the system operator employs over various time-
frames to maintain the supply-demand balance on a continuous
basis [9].
Participation of DR in multiple markets may necessitate a
trade-off between the services offered. Thus the optimal DR
provision of multiple services should be determined by opti-
mising DR’s participation in multiple markets simultaneously.
The importance of valuing DR correctly was highlighted in
[10]. This paper informs the discussion on the value of DR by
exploring the impact of DR participation in energy and reserve
markets, simultaneously. The electricity market is modelled
as a Mixed Complementarity Problem (MCP) wherein the
objective functions of various electricity market participants
are optimised simultaneously and in equilibrium.
MCPs have been widely deployed in the literature for
electricity market analysis. Research questions addressed using
MCPs include the analysis of new generation investments in
energy markets [11], [12], reserve markets [13] and capacity
markets [14], [15], [16].
In recent years MCPs have been used to examine price-
responsive demand. Daoxin et al. [17] include both renewable
generation and price responsive demand in their MCP. Price
responsive demand is modelled through the use of a control
parameter reflecting the response of consumers to changes in
price. However, constraints on the price responsive demand are
not taken into account and reserve provision is not considered.
While there has been research examining the interaction of DR
with high levels of wind penetration, reserve markets with DR
participation have only been incorporated through the use of
least-cost modelling [18], [19] rather than MCPs. In the first
case study in [18], demand is modelled as a constant value
modified by a sinusoid. Furthermore, the authors assume that
DR is a fixed fraction of the total system demand at each point
in time. In the second case study in [18], hourly demand and
wind data is utilized and DR is assumed to be 5% of the
system load in each hour.
Conejo et al. [20] propose an hourly real-time DR model.
The demand model minimizes the cost of meeting the load
minus the utility of the customers. Unlike [17], [20] includes
physical constraints, as opposed to consumer or behavioural
constraints, pertaining to the demand resource, including a
minimum energy consumption constraint and ramping limits.
Reserve provision by the DR resource is not considered.
Nekouei et al. [21] provide a game-theoretic approach
for DR. Interplay between aggregators and generators is
formulated as a Stakelberg game. The consumer minimizes
load curtailment costs, while the aggregator minimizes the
aggregate inconvenience of customers. Reserve provision by
the demand-side is not considered. Brijs et al. [22] examines
multiple revenue streams available to storage devices, which
have similarities with DR. However they restrict their attention
to energy services provision over different time scales and for
different applications, and do not consider reserve provision.
The authors in [23] employ an MCP model that min-
imizes costs while incorporating price-responsive demand.
They found there have been no generation technology mix
models that consider DR with hourly varying prices and
energy efficiency programs simultaneously, while including
dynamic operating constraints. They propose three method-
ologies for integrating short-term demand responsiveness into
a technology mix optimization model, one of which is a
complementarity programming method [23] and utilize the
same DR models in each method. The key difference with
the work presented here is the manner in which the DR is
represented. A reference price and quantity demanded for each
2hour along with elasticity assumptions are considered in [23],
while this paper models a load-shifting DR resource based on
heating demand data, which includes the ability to provide
reserve and an energy limit constraint.
The original contributions of this paper are both method-
ological and data focused. On the methodological side, we in-
clude a load-shifting DR resource within an MCP framework.
The optimal decisions of the DR operator are determined,
rather than restricting focus to the DR operation that would
prevail under least-cost modelling. The model also includes
optimal investment and exit decisions by generation firms,
which have not been considered in the literature to date,
as well as optimal operational decisions by all parties. Our
data contribution is the realistic modelling of a specific DR
resource, that of electrical space and water heating, rather
than considering a generic demand response as has been
the case in the literature to date. Space and water heating
is a particularly appropriate resource due to its inherent
thermal inertia, rendering it suitable for load-shifting whilst
maintaining the ability to meet customers’ heating demands.
These methodological contributions enable us to consider the
impact of DR participation in both energy and reserve markets.
Analysis of multiple service provision from DR resources
within an MCP has not been considered in the literature to
date. These questions are considered in the context of a generic
electricity market.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section II introduces the
MCP methodology employed including the DR aggregator
problem. Input data and case study information is discussed
in Section III. Section IV presents the results and sensitivities,
Section V discusses the key findings and Section VI concludes.
II. METHODOLOGY
This section details the conventional generation firms’ and
DR aggregator’s problems as well as the market clearing
conditions, under competitive market conditions. Parameters
are denoted with capital letters, primal variables with lower
case letters, and Lagrange multipliers associated with the
constraints with lower-case Greek letters.
A. Demand Response Aggregator’s Problem
In this paper we model one DR aggregator whose problem
is to choose DR in both the downward and upward direc-
tion (drtdown and dr
t
up respectively) and reserve provision
(reservetdr) so as to maximize profits from energy and re-
serve markets. The DR provision is determined relative to a
reference demand, the energy that would be consumed by
devices in the DR sector in the absence of any DR. It is
assumed that, in future electricity markets, reference demands
(DREF t) relating to DR resources will be knowable and
obtainable by DR aggregators, and that reserve markets are
non-discriminatory, permitting the participation of DR. It is
also assumed that DR aggregators are capable of responding to
wholesale electricity market prices in realtime. The total load-
shifting performed by the DR resource is the net result of a
combination of drtdown and dr
t
up, the upwards and downwards
change from the reference demand at each time, t.
The parameter DREF t represents the reference demand,
or the electricity that would be consumed in the absence of
any DR. The parameter DMAX represents the total installed
capacity of the DR resource. Equation (1a) is the objective
function of the DR aggregator. The DR aggregator chooses
how to participate in each market in order to maximize their
profit. Equation (1b) represents the energy component of the
DR aggregator’s profit and consists of the revenue obtained
from the energy market due to load-shifting as well as the
cost of meeting the consumer’s reference demand, DREF t.
Equation (1c) denotes the reserve component of the DR
aggregator’s profit. Constraint (1d) ensures that, in each time-
step, t, the DR aggregator can only shift downwards and can
only provide upward reserve (from the point of view of the
power system) by an amount less than or equal to the reference
demand. That is, the DR resource can only shift downwards
and/or provide reserve if the end-user appliances are on and
available. Equation (1e) constrains the upward shifting of the
resource to be less than the installed capacity of the end-
user appliance, DMAX . Constraint (1f) represents the energy
limited nature of the DR resource and ensures that any shifting
downwards is balanced by shifting upwards over a 24 hour
period.
The DR aggregator’s problem is thus:
max
drdown
drup
reserveDR
capdr
Πdr = Πenergy + Πreserve, (1a)
where
Πenergy =
∑
t
(drtdown − drtup −DREF t)× λt, (1b)
Πreserve =
∑
t
(reservetdr)× µt, (1c)
subject to:
drtdown + reserve
t
DR ≤ DREF t, (γt1), ∀t, (1d)
drtup +DREF
t ≤ DMAX, (γt2), ∀t, (1e)
t′+23∑
t=t′
(drtdown) =
t′+23∑
t=t′
(drtup), (γ
t′
3 ), ∀t′ ∈ {1, 25, 49, ...},
(1f)
The model of the DR can be adapted for different DR
resources other than the water and space heaters considered
here. This is easily achieved by varying the values of the pa-
rameters relating the maximum installed capacity (DMAX),
the reference demand (DREF t) and the reserve provision
capabilities.
3B. Generating Firm’s Problem
Firm i’s objective is to maximise profits, Πigen, which
they earn in energy, reserve and capacity markets, Πienergy,
Πireserve and Π
i
capacity , respectively. Firms own conventional
thermal generation only and participate in these markets via
their investment and operation in conventional generation.
There is no cost associated with reserve provision as it is
assumed that the cost of providing reserve is the opportunity
cost of providing energy. Wind is included as a separate player,
not owned by any generation firm, whose sole function is
to reduce net demand, and does not participate in either the
reserve or the capacity market.
Firms choose the amount of generation (gent,i,j), reserve
provision (reservet,i,jgen ) and their capacity bid (cap
i,j
bid) for all
of their generating units, where j represents the generating
technology and t is the time index, in this case 1-hour.
Firms also choose to invest in new capacity (investi,j) and
decommission existing capacity (exiti,j). Each generating firm
may have multiple types of generating technologies. The MCP
is thus a game where the firms compete a` la Cournot.
Firm i’s objective function is Equation (2). Each generating
firm chooses their profit-maximising participation in each
market simultaneously. Equation (3) represents the generator’s
energy market profit and consists of the market price less
the marginal cost MCi,j of producing energy multiplied by
the generation. Equation (4) denotes the generator’s reserve
market profit. Equation (5) represents the revenue from the
capacity market less investment and maintenance costs associ-
ated with capacity provision. Equation (6) constrains the power
and reserve provided by a generating unit to be less than or
equal to their installed capacity. Equation (7) ensures each
generator’s capacity bid does not exceed its installed capacity.
The parameter ICOST j represents the investment cost of
generating technology j, while MCOST j is the maintenance
cost associated with technology j. The parameter CAP i,j
represents the initial endowment of generating capacity for
each firm i and technology j. Firm’s i’s problem is thus:
max
gen
exit
invest
cap
Πi =
∑
j
Πi,jenergy +
∑
j
Πi,jreserve +
∑
j
Πi,jcapacity,
(2)
where
Πi,jenergy =
∑
t
(gent,i,j)× (λt −MCi,j), (3)
Πi,jreserve =
∑
t
(reservet,i,jgen )× µt, (4)
Πi,jcapacity = (cap
i,j
bid)× (κ)− (investi,j)× ICOST j
−(CAP i,j − exiti,j)×MCOST j , (5)
subject to:
gent,i,j + reservet,i,jgen ≤ CAP i,j − exiti,j + investi,j ,
(θt,j1 ), ∀t, j,
(6)
capi,jbid ≤ CAP i,j − exiti,j + investi,j , (θi,j2 ), ∀t, j, (7)
The variables λt, µt and κ represent the prices associated
with the energy, reserve and capacity markets receptively. Each
are exogenous to the firms’ problems but are variables of the
overall model determined via the market clearing conditions.
All of the generating firms’ primal variables are constrained
to be non-negative.
C. Market Clearing Conditions
The market clearing conditions vary depending on the sce-
nario under investigation. The first market clearing condition
models the energy market when DR is not considered:∑
i,j
gent,i,j = DEM t + E × λt, ∀t, (λt), (8a)
where the parameter DEM t denotes the demand intercept
in hour t. The parameter E represents the slope of the demand
curve, and so this market clearing condition incorporates price-
responsive demand (assuming E is non-zero). This price-
responsive load is distinct from the DR resource’s load shift-
ing. When DR is included Equation (8a) becomes:∑
i,j
gent,i,j = DEM t −DREF t + drtup − drtdown + E × λt
∀t, (λt).
(8b)
The market clearing conditions for the reserve market, with
and without DR participation, are:∑
i,j
reservet,i,jgen = RESERV EREQ
∀t, (µt),
(8c)
∑
i,j
reservet,i,jg en+ reserve
t
DR = RESERV EREQ
∀t, (µt),
(8d)
The market clearing condition for the capacity market, in
which DR does not participate, is∑
i
capibid = TARGET, (κ), (8e)
The parameter RESERV EREQ is the total reserve re-
quired and the parameter TARGET represents the amount
of generation capacity required.
The MCP models are developed in the General Algebraic
Modeling System (GAMS) and solved using the PATH solver
[24]. The market clearing conditions presented in the previous
section are utilized in conjunction with the firms’ problems and
the DR aggregator’s problem in different combinations in order
to produce a number of different MCP models. The models
in Table I model DR participation in various combinations of
markets. In these cases, conventional generation firms partici-
pate in energy, reserve and capacity markets. The models are
run both with and without price-responsive demand.
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MCP MODELS CONSIDERED
DR Case
Participation 1 2 3
Energy — ! !
Reserve — — !
Capacity — — —
TABLE II
INITIAL ENDOWMENT OF CAPACITY CAP i,j FOR EACH FIRM AND
TECHNOLOGY TYPE (MW)
f1 f2 f3 f4 f5 f6 Sum
BL 1000 800 500 500 400 — 3200
MM — 500 400 — 400 — 1300
PK — — 200 300 200 200 900
1000 1300 1100 800 1000 200 5400
III. INPUT DATA
A. System Data
The models are run in a stylised electricity market with
six conventional generation firms and a single DR aggregator.
The initial endowment of capacity for each firm CAP i,j is
shown in Table II and the corresponding cost characteristics
are presented in Tables III and IV. The costs data are all based
on the values employed in [16] with some variation between
the marginal costs for each unit within each technology group.
The reserve requirement, RESERV EREQ, is 500 MW
unless otherwise stated. This level broadly complies with the
reserve requirements for different levels of installed wind for
the Irish power system [25]. The capacity target, TARGET ,
is 1.2 times the system peak load. All players are assumed to
be price-takers.
B. Demand and wind data
The consumer end-use heating time series obtained by the
methodology in [26] are used as the parameter DREF t. The
installed capacity, DMAX , is 556 MW. An annual system
demand profile from Ireland for the year 2009 [27] is scaled
linearly as appropriate to produce the parameter DEM t, with
TABLE III
MARGINAL COST OF EACH FIRM (e/MW)
f1 f2 f3 f4 f5 f6
BL 30 45 55 55 65 —
MM — 50 35 — 35 —
PK — — 93 83 93 93
TABLE IV
INVESTMENT AND ANNUAL MAINTENANCE COSTS (e/MW)
MCOST j ICOST j
BL 25 100000
MM 12 65000
PK 7 45000
Fig. 1. System demand with the addition of demand response over a four
day period for a peak load of 2500 MW with no wind generation (E=-0.11)
peak load levels of 2500MW, 5000MW and 7500MW. For
example, when peak load in the following sections is stated
to be 7500 MW then, for each hourly timestep, DEM t is
1.5 times that of when peak load is stated to be 5000 MW.
This allows us to model cases of over and undercapacity.
The analysis is performed for the first 100 days of the year,
which covers the winter peak demand and captures the impact
of capacity constraints. Wind capacity factors are determined
based on historical Irish wind data, also from 2009. The slope
of the demand curve (E) is set at −0.11 as determined by Di
Cosmo & Hyland [28].
IV. RESULTS
A. Equilibrium prices and investment
Considering DR participation in energy markets only, the
first immediate effect of DR participation in the energy market
only is on the demand profile. DR reduces system demand
peaks and increases system demand at the troughs as shown
in Figure 1. While this result is as expected it validates the
model and methodology.
When DR participates in reserve as well as energy markets
the results are similar. In particular, the reserve price (µt)
is e0 with and without DR participation in the reserve
market. This is because the capacity target of 1.2 times the
peak demand dominates the reserve requirement of 500MW.
Conventional generation firms, having invested in capacity to
meet the capacity target, can meet the reserve requirement
at any demand level and so the reserve constraint does not
bind. The value of the Lagrange multiplier on that constraint,
µt, is therefore consistently zero. Intuitively, the revenue from
the capacity market drives investment decisions, rather than
reserve market revenue. Furthermore, there is no incentive for
DR to change its operational strategy and so DR’s participation
in the energy market is unchanged. Thus the electricity price
is also unchanged by DR participation in reserve markets.
Table V displays the capacity price, κ, associated with a
peak load of 2500 MW, with and without price-responsive
demand (E=-0.11 and E=0 respectively). When there is no
price-responsive demand, DR increases the capacity price from
5TABLE V
CAPACITY PRICES, κ, FOR 2500 MW OF PEAK LOAD AND WITH A
RESERVE REQUIREMENT OF 500 MW AND NO WIND
DR Market Participation
E No DR Energy Energy & Reserve
E = 0 e3.35 e7 e7
E = −0.11 e7 e7 e7
e3.35 to e7 per MW. This is because price-responsive demand
reduces demand at the peak (as opposed to shifting demand
from peak to off-peak, which is the function of the load-
shifting DR resource modelled), leading to lower equilibrium
levels of installed capacity. This increases the marginal value
of capacity and thus the capacity price. The capacity price
of e7 equates to the maintenance cost of the marginal unit,
which is a peaking unit.
B. Consumer Costs
In determining consumer costs, Equation (9) is used for
the models without DR, while Equation (10) is employed for
the models with DR. These costs are the total costs incurred
by consumers, rather than the fuel, carbon and other costs
incurred by the generating firms.
CostNoDR =
∑
t,i,j
(Gent,i,j × λt + reservet,i,jGen × µt)
+
∑
i,j
(Capi,jBid)× κ
+WINDt × λt
(9)
CostDR =
∑
t,i,j
(Gent,i,j × λt + reservet,i,jGen × µt)
+
∑
i,j
(Capi,jBid)× κ
+
∑
t
(reservetDR × µt)
+WINDt × λt
(10)
DR induces a 6% reduction in consumer costs whether or
not there is price-responsive demand. This result concurs with
[29]. The reduction in consumer costs is primarily as a result
of lower electricity prices. These cost savings confirm that
there is a likely integration benefit associated with DR [10].
C. Generator Profit
Figure 2 shows the firms’ profits with DR participation
relative to no DR participation.
Generator profit is not dramatically impacted by the partic-
ipation of DR in the various electricity markets (Figure 2); in
fact, in some cases, profits increase slightly. The reduction
in consumer costs seen above, coupled with the fact that
generator profits are not dramatically reduced, represents a
Pareto improvement arising from the addition of DR. These
results differ from previous work where the introduction of
Fig. 2. Generator profit as a percentage of the ‘No DR’ case for different
demand response market participation frameworks
TABLE VI
DEMAND RESPONSE AGGREGATOR COSTS AT A PEAK LOAD OF 2500 MW
DR Case Energy Costs Savings
No DR e7,269,000 —
Energy Only e6,993,000 4%
Energy & Reserve e6,993,000 4%
more flexible demand generally reduces the generator profits,
see for example [30]. However, such results were calculated
considering only operational decisions without including in-
vestment and exit decisions. In contrast, the work presented
here determines equilibrium levels of capacity endogenously.
Consequently, the introduction of DR decreases generator in-
vestment and increases capacity prices, offsetting the reduced
electricity prices. When the impact of investment decisions is
excluded however, DR does indeed reduce generator profits,
which aligns with [30].
D. Demand Response Aggregator Costs
Table VI shows the costs incurred by the DR aggregator,
namely the costs of meeting the consumers’ electricity re-
quirements by purchasing electricity from the energy market.
For the cases examined here, the aggregator’s savings are
4% with the introduction of DR. This holds regardless of
whether there is price-responsive demand, and so this saving
is driven entirely by load shifting and is not as a result of
any savings from a reduction in peak demand. Furthermore,
varying marginal cost inputs and the generation portfolio
induces no change in the aggregator’s savings.
A well-known result from the literature is that savings on
customers’ electricity bills may not be sufficient to warrant
investment in equipment and to compensate for the incon-
venience associated with engaging in a DR program [31].
These results of a relatively low DR aggregator’s savings are
consistent with this finding. Furthermore, additional savings
upon participation in the reserve market do not arise. This is
because, as discussed previously, the reserve price was effec-
tively zero at all times, as a result of the reserve requirement
being automatically met by the capacity target.
6Fig. 3. Electricity price with and without DR for a peak load of 5000 MW
Fig. 4. Electricity price with and without DR for a peak load of 7500 MW
E. The interaction of DR, wind and peak load
1) Equilibrium prices and investment: Figures 3 and 4
compare the market price with and without DR participation
for a system with a peak load of 5000MW and 7500MW
respectively. As the DR capacity is fixed, this amounts to
examining the impact of varying DR penetration. As expected,
the impact of DR diminishes with increasing peak load.
In Table V above the capacity price was e3.35 or e7
depending on the scenario considered (with a peak load of
2500MW). At a peak load level of 5000 MW, the capacity
price increases to e25 per MW for all scenarios and all wind
levels examined, with and without DR. This is the maintenance
cost of baseload units as baseload generation dominates the
generating portfolio.
At a peak load level of 7500 MW, the capacity price
remains at e25 per MW for all scenarios, except at a wind
penetration of 1500 MW (Table VII). At this wind level,
with no price-responsive demand and no load-shifting DR, the
capacity price is e65, the marginal cost of the most expensive
baseload unit on the system (Table III). However when price-
responsive demand is introduced the capacity price increases,
while the introduction of load-shifting DR induces a dramatic
increase. This is driven by the suppression of the electricity
TABLE VII
CAPACITY PRICES, κ, FOR 7500 MW OF PEAK LOAD AND WITH A
RESERVE REQUIREMENT OF 500 MW
DR Participation
Wind No Energy Energy &
Level E DR Only Reserve
500 MW 0 e25 e25 e25−0.11 e25 e25 e25
1000 MW 0 e25 e25 e25−0.11 e25 e25 e25
1500 MW 0 e65 e1370 e1370−0.11 e110 e1402 e1402
Fig. 5. System marginal price at a peak load of 7500 MW with wind
generation 20% of peak load
price (Figure 5), as a result of high wind generation and DR
participation. This suppression in electricity prices reduces
generator profits in the energy market and consequently, the
capacity market clears at a higher price to cover the firms’
investment costs.
In spite of this increase in capacity prices, system operating
costs do not increase drastically. This is primarily due to
modelling firms as price-takers, and so surplus profits in the
capacity market merely offset reduced revenues in the energy
market.
2) Demand response aggregator costs: For peak demand
of 2500MW, the aggregator’s costs decrease as wind increases
(see Table VIII). However this result does not hold at higher
peak load levels. This is because increased wind, and the
corresponding increase in variability of net demand, increases
the opportunities for DR to earn revenues from the energy
market, but also suppresses prices in the same market. The two
effects offset each other and lead to a constant level of savings
for the DR aggregator as wind generation increases at higher
peak load levels. The extent to which the two effects offset
each other, and the net result of increased wind generation, is
system-specific.
Table VIII illustrates that there is essentially no change in
the DR aggregator cost savings with price-responsive demand
included, i.e. with E = −0.11. Thus the DR aggregator’s
savings are driven entirely by the load-shifting capabilities
7TABLE VIII
DEMAND RESPONSE AGGREGATOR SAVINGS RELATIVE TO NO DR
PARTICIPATION (E=0 AND E=-0.11)
Peak load (MW)
Wind 2500 5000 7500
Energy Only
0MW
4% 9% 9%
Energy &
Reserve 4% 9% 9%
Energy Only
500MW
4% 9% 9%
Energy &
Reserve 4% 9% 9%
Energy Only
1000MW
4% 8% 9%
Energy &
Reserve 5% 8% 9%
Energy Only
1500MW
8% 8% 9%
Energy &
Reserve 8% 8% 9%
of the DR resource rather than consumer reduction in peak
demand. In general, DR aggregator savings increase with
increasing peak load.
V. DISCUSSION
There are several key insights that can be drawn from the
results above. Firstly, DR participation in energy markets does
succeed in reducing variability in electricity prices, whilst
increasing prices at off-peak hours and decreasing peak prices.
This induces significant system operating cost savings, mainly
driven by the impact of the DR resource on the energy market.
This result concurs with the literature, including literature
which has focused on the operational effects of DR to date.
What is interesting about the findings of this paper is that
this effect is not confined to energy markets. Instead, DR
participation leads to different equilibrium capacity prices and
investments, in spite of the fact that DR does not participate
in the capacity market. This is due to DR’s impact on the
conventional firms’ energy profits. The resulting combination
of energy and capacity market revenues for conventional
generation means that there is minimal impact on generating
firms’ equilibrium profits. DR participation therefore reduces
consumer costs but does not reduce generation firms’ profits,
which represents a Pareto improvement.
These positive impacts of DR participation in energy mar-
kets do not continue in the reserve market. This is due to the
fact that the capacity target in this paper induces sufficient
investment to allow firms to automatically meet the reserve
requirements modelled here. Thus reserve prices are zero for
nearly all hours considered. This result will hold for any mar-
ket that includes a capacity margin that is greater than or equal
to the reserve requirement. One could be tempted therefore
to conclude that capacity and reserve can be considered as
substitutes, as a capacity market automatically fulfils the role
of a reserve market. However, this paper did not consider
stochasticity, both in terms of wind generation and of forced
outages of thermal generators. Including these uncertainties,
which justify a non-zero capacity margin in the first place,
may see higher reserve prices. In this case DR participation
in the reserve market would change the equilibrium solution.
The impact of DR on equilibrium solutions is found to
depend on the generation technology portfolio of the market
in question, in particular the level of wind penetration. The
fact that the impact of any given technology on equilibrium
outcomes is dependant on the overall generation portfolio is a
well-known result, and underlines the importance of studying
entire generation portfolios rather than restricting focus to
metrics such as the Levelised Cost of Electricity (LCOE) that
consider each technology in isolation. In the particular case
of DR, the equilibrium outcomes that are driven by DR’s
interaction with varying levels of wind arise from the fact that
both technologies suppress prices in the energy market. Thus
varying the level of wind penetration enhances DR’s impact.
This interaction of wind and DR suggests that the optimal
DR penetration (and indeed, the optimal level of investment in
any technology) is system-specific. It is likely that were DR to
participate in capacity markets as well, yet another equilibrium
would be reached. We leave the inclusion of DR in capacity
markets for further work.
Sioshansi et al. [32] found that there were super-additive
social surplus gains from DR in day-ahead energy markets
only. We have also identified a similar effect that carries
through our three-market framework. Energy prices are su-
pressed, which leads to an increase in consumer surplus;
however generator profits are not significantly impacted by this
suppression of energy prices as the effect is offset by lower
capacity investment costs. There is thus no change to producer
surplus and the net effect is a welfare gain. Interestingly, at
lower load levels/higher proportions of DR, there is an increase
in the percentage reduction in system operating costs with
increasing wind levels, but minimal change in generator profit.
This effect mirrors that found by Siosanshi but makes it more
explicit by identifying the equilibrium across all markets.
In this paper the firms maximised profits without consider-
ing the variability of same. However in reality firms generally
exhibit risk-aversion, and so would instead maximise a risk-
adjusted utility function. The results reported here, where DR
reduces variability in electricity prices, suggest that DR can
enhance the welfare of risk-averse producers by reducing risk
as well as reducing electricity prices. Risk-averse consumers
would also benefit from this reduction in uncertainty.
The capacity market equilibria reached in this paper can give
some indication of the potential impact of DR participation in
capacity markets. In the case of over-capacity, including DR in
a capacity market would have little effect on the capacity price.
This is because the capacity price would clear at a minimum
of the level of marginal units maintenance costs, which in the
case of DR is zero. In the case of under-capacity, capacity
prices are determined by investment costs less any profits
earned in energy and reserve markets. DR participation in the
energy market will reduce energy prices and therefore reduce
energy market profits for other firms. This will apply upward
pressure to capacity prices. However, DR’s own participation
in the capacity market will provide downward pressure to ca-
pacity prices as DR has a negligible investment cost compared
to the investment costs of conventional generators. Therefore
the net effect of DR participation in capacity markets on
equilibrium capacity prices is unknown as it depends on the
8relative magnitude of these effects. Future work will establish
whether these hypotheses are true.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper examined the participation of a load-shifting
DR resource in energy and reserve markets. Several different
models considering different DR market participation are
developed. These markets are modelled as MCPs.
The results indicate that, in general, the DR resource can
have a positive impact on electricity markets. However, this
impact is largely limited to DR participation in the energy mar-
ket. The interaction of wind generation and demand response
does however induce changes in both energy and capacity
markets, in spite of the fact that demand response does not
participate in the capacity market. The resulting equilibrium
represents a Pareto improvement relative to the case with no
DR. The value of DR varies under different penetrations of DR
and wind, suggesting that the optimal level of DR is system-
specific.
Future research questions arising from this work include the
substitutability of capacity and reserve markets, the welfare-
enhancing capabilities of decreased variation in electricity
prices, and the effect of stochastic variables. The results from
this paper suggest that DR would have a positive impact when
these considerations are taken into account.
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